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8 State v. Sampson 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
the cases cited by the state are readily distinguish-
able in that no case involves two sets of Miranda 
warnings-the first followed by an equivocal 
request for counsel and the second followed by 
apparent waiver~as is the case before us. The 
cases, with the exception of Martin which we treat 
more fully in the text, instead involve some varia-
tion on the Elstad theme-statements made 
without Miranda warnings, followed by Miranda 
warnings, waiver, and further statements. 
The state additionally cites, in a letter submitted 
after argument on the petition for rehearing, Sfafe 
v. Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), claiming that this court there "held that [aj 
second set [of warnings) served as a clarification of 
the equivocal request/ We do not read Christoffc-
rson this way. The police officers in Christofferson 
apparently ceased questioning after the equivocal 
request for counsel, and proceeded to clarify the 
defendant's equivocal request. Once they did so and 
learned that the defendant did not desire counsel, 
the officers continued interrogation. Id. at 947. We 
hesitate to read the decision as equating a mere 
second administration of Miranda warnings, even if 
no Miranda rights were then invoked, with definitive 
clarification of an equivocal request for counsel. 
Such an important and far-reaching conclusion 
would surely have been accompanied by lengthy 
discussion and analysis, which is not to be found in 
the opinion, and is at odds with language in the 
opinion noting that clarifying questions were asked 
prior to proceeding with a second set of warnings 
and further interrogation. See id. 
6. The state's proffered analysis is further flawed in 
that the bright-line rule of Edwards, cited in Minnick 
v. Mississippi for "clarity of its command" 
and "certainty of its application," 111 S.Ct. at 490, 
would be undermined if courts were required to 
receive evidence pertaining to the lack of coercion 
attending an equivocal voluntariness of waiver of 
the request for counsel. In addition to breeding 
contempt for a cherished constitutional right, sign-
ificant judicial resources would be needlessly expe-
nded, a result clearly eschewed in Edwards and its 
progeny. 
7. Insofar as Martin*s view of an analogy between 
an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent 
and an equivocal request for counsel might suggest 
otherwise, we reject that view. Cf. Robcrson, 486 
U.S. at 683 (emphasizing distinction between exer-
cise of right to terminate interrogation and remain 
silent and right to counsel). 
8. The state also argues that even if defendant's 
statements must be suppressed, the derivative phys-
ical evidence, chiefly the victim's body, would be 
properly admitted, presumably by way of photogr-
aphs and descriptive testimony. The state proceeds 
upon the assumption that the interrogation subseq-
uent to defendant's equivocal reference to counsel, 
concededly a violation of the Miranda rule, was 
merely technically defective, not constitutionally 
infirm. The state calls our attention to several deci-
sions in which other courts have allowed the admi-
ssion of derivative evidence obtained subsequent to 
interrogation conducted in violation of the technical 
rules of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Patte-
rson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 
485 U.S. 922 (1988); In re Owen F., 70 Md. App. 
678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528 
A.2d 1286 (1987); Sfare v. Wethercd, 110 Wash. 2d 
466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). We find the cases cited by 
the state to be inapplicable, as each addresses viol-
UTAH ADVA 
ations of the Miranda rule which are not deemed 
constitutional in dimension. We have already held in 
evaluating the state's Elstad argument that the vio-
lation of defendant's right to counsel was of cons-
titutional dimension and not merely a violation of 
Miranda. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Ame-
ndment is properly suppressed under the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 18. See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 
51, 52 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to request 
for counsel violates Fifth Amendment). See also Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 & n.3 (1984). While 
we are not ignorant of the obstacles which the state 
will face in presenting a case on remand without 
evidence of the body absent the applicability of 
some exception to the exclusionary rule, see Sampson, 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 & n.19, the 
derivative evidence of the child's body was obtained 
as a direct result of interrogation that was improper 
as a matter of constitutional law, and must, absent 
some exception, be suppressed. We are not enthus-
iastic about the obstacles our decision will create to 
securing defendant's conviction on retrial. But we 
are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional 
safeguards to assuage the frustrations that inhere in 
retrying a defendant clearly guilty of such a heinous 
crime. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S." at 442. 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction of 
possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute for value, Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), a second 
degree felony. Sims claims the stop of his 
vehicle in a roadblock conducted by the Utah 
Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure 
REPORTS 
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under the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Following oral argument, three cases rele-
vant to the issues presented in this appeal were 
decided. Those cases are Michigan Dcp't of 
State Police v. Sitz, __U.S , 110 S.Ct. 2481 
(1990); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' 
motion for supplemental briefing. Having 
considered the supplemental briefs, we now 
reverse his conviction, and remand for a new 
trial in which evidence seized from Sims' 
vehicle is to be suppressed. 
FACTS 
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers 
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab 
County Sheriffs Office conducted a roadb-
lock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately 
two miles south of Nephi, Utah. The roadb-
lock was planned and supervised by Utah 
Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson.1 Its 
purpose was to detect driver's license, auto-
mobile registration, and equipment violations, 
as well as liquor and drug violations. Notice 
that the roadblock would take place was 
published in the Juab County Times News two 
to four weeks prior to the roadblock. There 
was no evidence that the News was distributed 
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a 
major north-south route and link between 
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, Calif-
ornia. 
According to Mangelson, no written policy, 
from the Highway Patrol or from any other 
source, existed to guide the conduct of the 
roadblock in question. Mangelson indicated 
that his supervising lieutenant had given him 
permission to conduct the roadblock. 
The roadblock was staffed by about ten 
uniformed officers. A series of three signs 
within a one-half mile distance directed 
drivers to the roadblock, marked by orange 
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because 
stopping them might cause hazardous traffic 
congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed 
officers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle 
registration of the stopped motorists; while 
doing this, they were to watch for signs of 
liquor and drug violations. Officers could hold 
vehicles for further investigation if the initial 
contact raised questions. One of the officers, 
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his 
practice also included asking all drivers, reg-
ardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol, 
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2 
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle, 
a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the roadb-
lock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to 
contact Sims, saw nothing to cause him to 
suspect a violation of the law as Sims' vehicle 
approached.3 Howard asked for Sims' 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims 
produced a valid Georgia driver's license and 
a Utah registration in his name. In response to 
the trooper's question, Sims stated that he 
was en route from Los Angeles to Salt Lake 
City. While talking with Sims, Trooper 
Howard smelled alcohol inside the sedan and 
saw an "open" liquor bottle in the back seat 
area. He asked Sims if there were any alcohol, 
weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admi-
tted that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but 
denied carrying drugs or weapons. 
Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan, 
and asked for consent to look inside. Sims 
consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached 
and helped Howard search the car's interior. 
They discovered the remnants of one or two 
marijuana cigarettes in the right rear passenger 
door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he 
would mind if they searched the trunk of the 
sedan. Sims agreed and opened the trunk. 
Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard 
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby. 
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson disc-
overed two small plastic bags containing 
marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly nervous, 
then stated that he wanted the search stopped. 
Mangelson told Sims that, based on the disc-
overy of marijuana, he had probable cause to 
continue searching the trunk. Looking in the 
spare tire well, Mangelson found a kilogram 
brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress 
all evidence seized from his vehicle, conten-
ding that the roadblock stop was an unlawful 
seizure under the Utah and federal constitut-
ions and that the officers lacked probable 
cause to search the trunk. Following an evid-
entiary hearing, the trial court denied Sims' 
motion. The court determined that (1) the 
roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or 
federal constitutions; (2) Sims voluntarily 
consented to the search of the vehicle, inclu-
ding the trunk; and (3) Sergeant Mangelson 
had probable cause to continue searching the 
trunk after Sims' withdrawal of consent. 
Based on the evidence presented at the supp-
ression hearing and on the parties' written 
stipulation to the evidence, the trial court 
found Sims guilty of possession of a contro-
lled substance with intent to distribute. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadb-
lock stop of his vehicle violated his right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Const-
itution and the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution; and (2) there was 
insufficient attenuation between the unlawful 
detention and any consent to overcome the 
illegality of the roadblock. 
10 State v. Sims 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
CODE• Co 
Provo, Utah 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCK 
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely with 
the permissibility of the roadblock itself. 
Because it is undisputed that the roadblock 
was conducted with neither a warrant nor 
suspicion of wrongdoing by Sims, and that no 
emergency situation necessitated it, the ques-
tion of whether the roadblock was improper is 
reduced to one of law, and we review it 
without deference to the trial court. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
The State neither contests nor accepts Sims' 
arguments that the roadblock violated the 
fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Rather, the State invites us to 
decide this case solely on the basis of the att-
enuation issue. That is, we are to "assum[e] 
arguendo that the stop was illegal/ and 
remand this case for fact finding on whether 
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was obta-
ined through exploitation of the stop. 
We believe it inappropriate in this case, 
however, to simply assume that the roadblock 
was unconstitutional, without analysis. Sims 
has steadfastly and thoroughly argued the 
unconstitutionality of the roadblock, on both 
federal and state grounds, throughout these 
proceedings.4 The transcript of the suppression 
hearing and the trial court's written findings 
on the issue provide an ample factual record 
from which we can assess the constitutionality 
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, has 
been properly preserved and squarely prese-
nted on appeal. 
We are aware of the rule that we should 
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless 
required to do so. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This roadblock, 
however, was not an isolated incident, and our 
police may continue to use suspicionless roa-
dblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This 
makes all Utah motorists subject to closer 
police scrutiny than they might expect or, 
arguably, be legitimately required to encou-
nter. 
The right of citizens to be secure from 
unreasonable seizures "shall not be violated." 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, 
§14 (emphasis added). A roadblock or mot-
orist "checkpoint" is a seizure under the 
fourth amendment, Michigan Dep't of State 
Police v. Sitz, _U.S.__, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485 
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); there is no reason to 
hold otherwise with respect to our state cons-
titution. For the benefit of our citizens, as well 
as that of police charged with enforcing our 
laws, it behooves us to decide whether the 
roadblock that netted Sims was constitution-
ally permissible. We hold that it was not. 
Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadblocks. 
A prelude to the constitutional analysis per 
se is a determination of whether any statutory 
authority either permits or prohibits roadbl-
ocks of the sort conducted here, that is, a 
suspicionless, investigatory roadblock in which 
vehicles and drivers are screened for possible 
violations of law.* We note several statutes of 
interest, but none apply here. 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
operates ports of entry at which all large 
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock are 
stopped and inspected for, among other 
things, driver qualifications, registration, tax 
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah 
Code Ann. §27-12-19 (Supp. 1990). Our 
fish and game laws give the Division of Wil-
dlife authority to conduct roadblocks or game 
checking stations under Utah Code Ann. §23-
20-19 (1984), which makes it unlawful to fail 
to stop at such stations. These provisions are 
obviously inapplicable here. 
We also note that the Utah Highway Patrol 
is charged with the duty of "regulat[ing] 
traffic on all highways and roads of the 
state." Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(l)(b) 
(1989). This provision might authorize road-
block-type operations at, for example, acci-
dent scenes, or where hazardous road or 
traffic conditions require extra control. 
However, because this section in no way 
implies authority to conduct investigatory 
operations, it does not apply here. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990) allows 
a peace officer to "stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions."7 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §41-l-17(c) 
(1988) requires officers to stop a vehicle for 
driver's license, registration, and general ins-
pection "upon reasonable belief that any 
vehicle is being operated in violation of any 
provision of this act or of any other law reg-
ulating the operation of vehicles ...." These 
codifications of the familiar "reasonable sus-
picion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), were clearly not enacted with roadb-
lock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to 
the singling out of particular individuals or 
vehicles by the police, based on particularized 
suspicion. 
We find nothing in the Utah code that 
specifically prohibits the roadblock that was 
conducted here, however. Therefore, we query 
whether the roadblock was constitutionally 
prohibited. 
Fourth Amendment. 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court implied that 
roadblock stops for the purpose of checking 
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations 
might be constitutionally permitted. Holding 
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that a routine stop of an individual vehicle for 
such purpose, without articulable individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing, was impermis-
sible under the fourth amendment, the Court 
commented that "(t]his holding does not pre-
clude the State of Delaware or other States 
from developing methods for spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadb-
lock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. 
at 663. 
The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears, 
and in S/rz, the Court considered an investig-
atory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint," 
operated by the Michigan State Police Depa-
rtment. The checkpoint was operated under 
guidelines created by a special state advisory 
committee composed of law enforcement 
officials and transportation researchers from 
the University of Michigan. Those guidelines 
governed checkpoint publicity, site selection, 
and police procedure at the checkpoint itself. 
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2483-84. 
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling 
through the checkpoint were stopped and 
briefly checked for intoxication. Only if the 
initial examination revealed signs of intoxica-
tion would a motorist would be directed out 
of the traffic flow for a driver's license and 
registration check and further sobriety tests. 
The Sitz checkpoint was maintained for one 
hour and fifteen minutes. During that time, 
126 vehicles were stopped for an average of 
twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint 
yielded two arrests-approximately one and 
one-half percent of stopped drivers-for 
driving under the influence. Id. at 2484. 
Utilizing a balancing test developed in United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979), the Supreme Court held that Mich-
igan's sobriety checkpoint passed fourth 
amendment muster. The brief detention of 
motorists at the checkpoint was found to be 
only a "slight" infringement of their fourth 
amendment interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486. 
Outweighing this infringement were "the 
magnitude of the drunken driving problem 
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it," id. 
at 2485, along with the Court's assessment 
that the one and one-half percent drunk 
driver arrest rate demonstrated that the chec-
kpoint adequately advanced that interest. Id. 
at 2487-88; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-
51 and cases cited therein (permissibility of 
non-arrest seizure requires weighing public 
interest served thereby, degree to which it 
serves the interest, and severity of interference 
with individual liberty). 
According to the testimony of Sergeant 
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadb-
lock in the present case was of an "all-
purpose" variety. All vehicles except trucks 
were checked for licenses, registration, equi-
pment problems, driver sobriety, and signs of 
illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrong-
doing. The trial court, focusing on the last 
purpose, performed a balancing test as descr-
ibed above. It held that "a history of escala-
ting drug traffic along this stretch of Interstate 
15 as a result of other arrests, tends to legiti-
mize the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers to 
minimize the burden to individual citizens 
without discretion to engage in random roving 
stops."8 Without passing judgment on the 
accuracy of the trial court's balancing, we 
believe that analysis was premature and ther-
efore erroneous. 
As we read Sitz, Martinez-Fuerte, and Brown, 
a fourth amendment balancing test 
applies to warrantless seizures that, if not 
based upon articulable suspicion of an indiv-
idual, "must be carried out pursuant to a plan 
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers." Brown, 443 
U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). Additionally, 
such a plan should be developed by 
"politically accountable officials" with a 
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility 
for, limited, public resources, including a finite 
number of police officers." Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 
2487. Those officials, and not the courts, are 
responsible for performing the initial balan-
cing between the fourth amendment and the 
interests served by the plan. Id. While the Sitz 
sobriety checkpoint met these requirements, 
the roadblock used here did not. 
No explicit plan, beyond a determination 
that all vehicles other than large trucks were to 
be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor 
does it appear that Sergeant Mangelson or the 
lieutenant who gave him permission to 
conduct the roadblock are politically accoun-
table officials as contemplated in Sitz.10 The 
process by which the roadblock was author-
ized also lacked features of political account-
ability that were arguably present in Sitr. the 
Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to 
careful advance study that included non-
police public officials, while authority for this 
roadblock arose solely within a police agency. 
Finally, there is no indication that the autho-
rization process here involved any balancing of 
fourth amendment interests and law enforce-
ment interests, or an assessment of the effec-
tiveness of the roadblock in meeting those 
interests. Instead, the lack of any written 
guidelines arising from the authorization 
process strongly suggests that no such analysis 
took place. 
The requirement of explicit guidelines, 
developed in a politically accountable manner 
that includes balancing of the relevant conc-
erns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to any 
judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless 
roadblock.11 After-the-fact judicial balan-
cing of the interests implicated by such a 
roadblock cannot make it constitutionally 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
proper. Therefore, we hold that the roadblock 
in which Sims was detained violated the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution.12 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14. 
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines 
stresses the principle that when police operat-
ions interfere with fourth amendment inter-
ests, "the discretion of the official in the field 
[must] be circumscribed, at least to some 
extent." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
661 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly 
places both guideline development and the 
decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in 
the first place in the hands of "politically 
accountable" officials. We view roadblock 
authorization and guideline development as 
separate steps, however. The initial decision to 
permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially 
critical, and requires a higher degree of polit-
ical accountability than the guideline develo-
pment step. Sims argues that the lack of stat-
utory authority renders suspicionless roadbl-
ocks improper under the Utah Constitution. 
As regards the initial authority to permit such 
roadblocks, we agree. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion is virtually identical to the fourth amen-
dment. Like its federal counterpart, it consists 
of a "reasonableness" clause and a "warrant" 
clause: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable sear-
ches and seizures shall not be viol-
ated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying the 
United States Supreme Court's "vacillation 
between the warrant approach and the reaso-
nableness approach" regarding automobile 
searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the warrant approach under our 
constitution, stating that " [warrantless sear-
ches and seizures are per se unreasonable 
unless exigent circumstances require action 
before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470 
(quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 
411 (Utah 1984)). 
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation 
of privacy in the interior of the subject car, 
parked unattended and unlocked on a public 
street, triggered the application of article I, 
section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. Police offi-
cers' warrantless opening of the car's door to 
view the vehicle identification number on the 
doorjamb was found to constitute a search 
subject to the fourth amendment's warrant 
requirement. The search was then held impr-
UTAH 
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oper under article I, section 14, because there 
was no threat that the car would disappear 
before a warrant could be obtained to look 
inside it. The court held that such "exigent 
circumstances" to support a warrantless search 
did not exist where the car was not en route 
away from the officers* jurisdiction and the 
suspect had not been alerted to police interest 
in it. Id. at 470-71. 
Under article I, section 14 our supreme 
court applies a "warrants whenever possible" 
policy to motor vehicle searches and seizures. 
Id. This policy is consistent with one funda-
mental purpose of constitutional search and 
seizure limits: the interposition of neutral 
authority between police seeking evidence of 
crimes and the citizens from whom such evi-
dence is sought.13 
In the usual non-exigent circumstances 
search and seizure scenario, the judicial 
branch, through a magistrate, serves as the 
neutral authority that issues or denies a 
warrant to perform a search or seizure. The 
warrant is issued only when probable cause 
exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, 
art. I, §14. Our state legislature, however, 
has also served as a neutral authority between 
our police and our citizens, in authorizing 
certain seizures upon less than probable cause. 
As already noted, our legislature has foll-
owed the courts' lead in authorizing brief 
warrantless stops of individuals and motor 
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 Also 
as noted, the legislature has acted independe-
ntly in authorizing ports of entry, as well as 
fish and game checkpoints. These operations, 
supported by neither warrants nor any level of 
individualized suspicion, clearly implicate 
article I, section 14 of our constitution. 
From an operational standpoint, ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely 
resemble the roadblock that was conducted in 
this case, in that all large trucks, or all vehi-
cles used by hunters, respectively, are submi-
tted to official inspections. However, in aut-
horizing these operations, our legislature has, 
presumably, weighed the need for such suspi-
cionless inspections against their intrusion 
upon individual liberty,15 a process analogous 
to that performed by a magistrate in the iss-
uance of a warrant. A high degree of political 
accountability for the institution of these 
practices can also be presumed, in that repre-
sentatives of truckers, hunters, law enforce-
ment, and the citizenry at large all very likely 
played a part in passing the relevant statutes. 
In each case of legislation authorizing spe-
cific types of checkpoints or stops of persons 
or vehicles, with or without individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing, the citizens of this 
state have acted through their elected repres-
entatives. Therefore, the collective will of the 
people is expressed and, furthermore, the 
people have notice of duly authorized police 
activity. 
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In stark contrast, the roadblock conducted 
in this case was authorized solely by police 
officers, the very people whose behavior 
article I, section 14 is intended to limit. No 
non-law enforcement officials took part in 
the decision to set up the roadblock. Leaving 
the initial decision to conduct such operations 
in police hands creates a scheme that is both 
unrealistic and constitutionally untenable. 
We believe that legislative authorization of 
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints, 
like the issuance of a judicial warrant, triggers 
at least some presumption that these law enf-
orcement practices are constitutionally perm-
issible. Because the roadblock in this case had 
neither form of authorization, it was entitled 
to no such presumption. Both warrants and 
statutes originate outside the executive branch, 
serving to check abuses of that branch's law 
enforcement power. Consistent with our 
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant 
requirement, then, we hold that suspicionless, 
investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, con-
ducted without legislative authorization, are 
per se unconstitutional under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In requiring legislative authority as a prer-
equisite to the use of suspicionless investiga-
tory roadblocks, we join two other western 
states that have similarly construed their con-
stitutions. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); Nelson v. 
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(1987).16 At least one other state has establi-
shed the same standard under the fourth 
amendment. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 
(Okla. App. 1984). This approach is particul-
arly appropriate where a proposed police 
practice will, as here, affect everyone travel-
ling our state's highways. Because of its close 
ties to the citizens whose rights will be affe-
cted, the minimum necessary political accou-
ntability for such practices lies, at the outset, 
with our legislature. 
Our holding that article I, section 14 proh-
ibits suspicionless investigative roadblocks 
without legislative authority, in effect, requires 
the legislature to perform the S/fz-type bal-
ancing function if and when it decides to 
consider the authorization of such roadblocks. 
Judicial balancing of the interests implicated 
by such roadblocks, then, will need to occur 
only if and when the legislature, upon perfo-
rming such balancing itself, decides to autho-
rize them.17 We, unlike our colleague in his 
concurring opinion, prefer that the legislature 
announce its view of public policy and the 
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards 
roadblocks, prior to the court applying cons-
titutional analysis to the legislature's product.18 
We also emphasize that our holding on the 
state constitutionality of the roadblock in 
which Sims was stopped is limited in its app-
lication to similar, non-emergency situations. 
It is not intended to apply to emergency roa-
dblocks that might, for example, be used to 
apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor do we intend 
to impede any existing authority to conduct 
roadblocks for traffic control purposes. Any 
constitutional challenge to these types of 
traffic stops awaits another day. It is the sus-
picionless, investigative, non-emergency 
roadblock, conducted in the absence of legis-
lative authority, that we hold to be unconsti-
tutional. 
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM 
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Sims argues that there was insufficient att-
enuation between his detention and the consent 
he gave to search his vehicle to purge the taint of 
the illegality of the detention. He does not claim 
that his consent was coerced from him and was 
therefore involuntary. Rather, he argues that 
because there were no intervening circumstances 
between the detention and the consent, the con-
sent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and, 
therefore, evidence seized pursuant to his con-
sent should have been ordered suppressed. Sims 
did not make this argument in the trial court. 
Normally, "where a defendant fails to assert 
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appe-
llate court will not consider that ground on 
appeal." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985); see also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 71 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12. Unless a ground for suppression 
is "unknown or unavailable" to a defendant at 
the time a suppression motion is filed, the 
right to challenge the admission of evidence on 
that ground is waived. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, however, because 
our then-standing decisions effectively held 
that a non-coerced search consent, by itself, 
purged the taint of a primary illegality, Sims' 
non-attenuation argument was unavailable to 
him in the trial court and would have been 
pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). There-
fore, it is proper to address that argument 
now. 
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing this 
court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 
153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), held that, 
to be constitutionally valid, a search consent 
following illegal police behavior must be both 
noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation 
of the primary police illegality. Factors used to 
evaluate the non-exploitation or attenuation 
element are derived from Brown v. Illinois, 
All U.S. 590 (1975), which involved a confe-
ssion obtained from a criminal suspect after 
his illegal arrest. They include the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the 
granting of consent, the presence or absence 
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of intervening circumstances, and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4 (citing Brown, All 
U.S. at 603-04, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure §8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)). 
The Arroyo case was remanded to the trial 
court for fact finding on the issue of whether 
the defendant's consent to search his vehicle 
was attenuated from or an exploitation of his 
illegal stop. Because the burden is on the State 
to show that evidence obtained following 
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the 
illegality, Brown, All U.S. at 604, and because 
the attenuation issue was not presented to the 
trial court, a remand to examine the attenua-
tion factors has been suggested here. We find, 
however, that the record now before us cont-
ains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us 
to determine the issue as a matter of law. See id. 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, 
the record demonstrates a very short time span 
between Sims' stop in the roadblock and 
Trooper Howard's request to search his aut-
omobile. The trooper had but a brief conver-
sation with Sims, regarding his license and 
registration, his trip itinerary, and possession 
of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking 
for consent to search his car. The consent was 
obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, 
and not even under our clear error standard of 
review could the trial court find enough time 
between the stop and the grant of consent to 
attenuate the relationship between the two.19 
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of 
intervening circumstances between the illegal 
stop and Sims' grant of consent to the search. 
Such circumstances must be independent of 
the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-
91. Here, Trooper Howard's request for 
consent to search Sims' sedan was based upon 
the smell of alcohol, the sight of the open 
liquor bottle in the sedan, and Sims' admis-
sion, uneventful since the bottle was in 
obvious view, that he was carrying alcohol. 
Howard's opportunity to make these observ-
ations and to question Sims, however, depe-
nded entirely on the illegal roadblock. Neither 
Sims' driving nor the external appearance of 
his vehicle justified stopping him. Nothing 
occurred which could have reasonably made 
him feel free to proceed on his journey at any 
time between the moment of his stop and the 
discoveries that prompted the trooper's 
request for consent to search his vehicle.20 
Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his 
consent, but gave it only when asked. Sims' 
consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain 
of events that began with the illegal roadb-
lock. 
The final factor in the attenuation analysis 
is an examination of the purpose and flagr-
ancy of the primary police illegality. Here, this 
factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated 
to the question of whether a search consent 
flowed from, i.e., was an exploitation of, the 
illegal police conduct.21 Instead, it appears to 
be an alternative approach, inviting us to 
overlook unconstitutional police conduct that 
serves good purposes and is not too flagrant. 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified 
at some length about their expertise in drug 
interdiction, and the trial court treated the 
roadblock as if that was its primary purpose. 
However noble this purpose might be, it was 
pursued by an unauthorized means. The tro-
opers each had years of law enforcement 
experience, and can properly be charged with 
awareness that their action was not authorized 
by law. "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." Olms-
tead v. United States, 111 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve 
law officers to staff the roadblock may have 
also left distant parts of the largely rural jur-
isdiction with delayed police assistance in the 
event of need. Thus, although it does not 
appear that the officers behaved abusively 
toward those stopped at the roadblock, this 
does not correct the constitutional violation. 
In sum, the record demonstrates that Sims' 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by 
exploitation of the illegal roadblock. Accord-
ingly, that consent was invalid. Because the 
exclusionary rule applies to violations of both 
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evid-
ence obtained under that consent must be 
suppressed. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE 
SEARCH 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson believed 
that the discovery of marijuana in Sims' sedan 
under the consent search gave them probable 
cause to continue searching after consent was 
withdrawn. However, because the initial 
consent was invalid, any probable cause found 
while searching under that consent was also 
invalid. Absent probable cause to search the 
sedan without Sims' consent, we need not 
reach the issue of whether exigent circumsta-
nces existed to make the warrant requirement 
inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Sims' conviction for possession of a contr-
olled substance with intent to distribute is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial 
court for proceedings in accord with this 
opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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ORME, J. (concurring specially): 
While I otherwise concur fully in the court's 
opinion, 1 have two difficulties with the disc-
ussion treating the roadblock under article I, 
section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if 
the roadblock cannot even be validated under 
the questionable "balancing" approach of 
Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), see, 
e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
we have no need to examine whether it might 
be additionally invalid under the state consti-
tution. Second, and more importantly, I am 
not enthusiastic about suggesting that the 
legislature, any more than the courts or the 
police, should be about the business of bala-
ncing away important constitutional protect-
ions that safeguard all of us so that law enf-
orcement can more readily catch an occasional 
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free 
from police intrusion in the total absence of 
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing 
should simply not be at the mercy of the leg-
islature's determination of how tourism or our 
hopes for the Olympics might somehow be 
adversely impacted by one law enforcement 
technique or another. 
If it were necessary to reach the state cons-
titutional issue in this case, i.e., if the roadb-
lock passed muster under the federal constit-
ution, I would be more inclined to solidify 
longstanding constitutional precepts as at the 
core of article I, section 14, than to borrow 
the troublesome "balancing" approach embr-
aced in Sitz, adopt some variation of that 
approach, and begin a journey down that 
nebulous path. Cf. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 469 (Utah 1990) (state constitutional 
analysis employed "to simplify ... the search 
and seizure rules so that they can be more 
easily followed by the police and the courts 
and, at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures."). I would 
probably prefer to hold that the rule of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), uniformly applied 
by Utah courts, is a matter of Utah constitu-
tional law that simply may not be balanced 
away by any branch of our government and 
that is not amenable to a roadblock exception. 
Under established Utah decisional law, in 
the absence of any individualized suspicion, 
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., State 
v. Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A 
level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter. 
Id. And one does not lose the right to decline 
to participate in a level one encounter simply 
because one chooses to drive rather than to 
- ~ ^ — ., cm/fh 781 P.2d 879, 881 
other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 
Feb. 7, 1991). See also, Delaware v. Prowse, 
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (persons do not lose 
the protections of fourth amendment "when 
they step from the sidewalk into their autom-
obiles"); State v. Talbot, 789 P.2d 489, 491, 
494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
If, as seems clear, the police cannot require 
every pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to 
stop and answer police inquiries, I am hard-
pressed to see how they can stop every car on 
a stretch of the interstate highway and require 
the driver to answer inquiries. In my view, the 
only roadblock that is sure to pass state con-
stitutional muster is one which would qualify 
as a level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 
Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock 
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock or 
otherwise refusing to cooperate not detained). 
I see no constitutional problem with a road-
side police checkpoint announced by a sign on 
the freeway, "Police Roadblock Next Exit. 
Your Cooperation in Answering Police Inqu-
iries Appreciated." Most drivers would stop, 
even though they could not be required to, 
just as most pedestrians will stop and respond 
to police inquiries on the sidewalk. But on 
neither medium of travel can one suspected of 
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to do 
so. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal 
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate 
courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Stare v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). See also United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 
991 (10th Cir. 1990). Besides the present case, at 
least one other case involving an automobile search 
by Sergeant Mangelson is pending in this court. Srare 
v. Kitchen, No. 900307-CA. As a central 
player in at least five published search and seizure 
scenarios to date, the redoubtable trooper's notor-
iety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics 
detection dog whose nose for crime has figured in at 
least seven published federal cases in the District of 
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer, 878 
F.2d 469, 471 and n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and cases 
cited therein. 
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the 
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to this 
question could prompt Trooper Howard to then 
seek consent to search automobiles without any 
other suspicion of wrongdoing: 
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity, 
did anybody answer "yes" [to query 
about alcohol, weapons, or contraband] 
when everything appeared in order so 
you would have to conduct a further 
search? 
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had 
several people do that. 
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3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by 
defense counsel included the following exchange: 
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] 
was doing anything wrong as he entered 
the roadblock or breaking any law; is 
that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional conc-
erns in his argument, Sims has answered calls by 
Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional 
analysis of search and seizure issues. See, e.g., Eari, 
716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 
425,426 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing cases). 
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock, it 
does not fit into the traditional "three levels" of 
Dolice stops, that have been described as follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
[any time] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 
U.S. 1142 (1986)). The level of individualized susp-
icion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one 
stop. However, since drivers were required to stop 
and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the 
roadblock stop went well beyond a level one enco-
unter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or 
three stop, since no individualized suspicion prom-
pted the stop. 
7. This provision has been characterized as a legisl-
atively enacted version of the so-called level two 
stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); note 6 supra. 
8. The court's definition of the public interest 
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking, 
appears to be contrary to testimony about the gen-
eralized purposes of the roadblock. There was no 
finding as to the actual efficacy of the roadblock in 
meeting the public purposes described by the offi-
cers or the more specific purposes identified by the 
court. 
9. While we understand that allowing large trucks to 
bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safety's 
sake, we wonder about the implications of this 
procedure for effective drug interdiction. The pro-
cedure seems to invite drug traffickers to transport 
their contraband in large trucks, and possibly rela-
tively massive quantities, to avoid detection. 
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 
(10th Cir. 1987), upholding the constitutionality of a 
roadblock for the purpose of checking driver's lic-
enses, vehicle registration, and insurance, pursuant 
only to the permission of a state police supervisor. 
Corral does not cite Brown's requirement, adopted 
in Sitz, of a plan explicitly limiting officer discre-
tion. In view of the reiteration of that requirement 
we find in Sitz, we do not accept CorraTs implica-
tion that supervisory permission to conduct a road-
block constitutes an adequate "plan." 
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden, 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which, in turn, was 
relied on by the trial court in holding the roadblock 
in this case constitutional. McFayden involved 
"traffic control" roadblocks set up to deal with 
traffic congestion associated with street level drug 
trafficking. The McFayden roadblocks were found 
to pass the reasonableness balancing test of Brown. 
Those roadblocks, again in contrast to the present 
situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordin-
ated plan developed by fwe District of Columbia 
police districts. 
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached by 
viewing the roadblock as an "administrative search." 
Supreme Court cases dealing with such searches 
have focused on the balance between the need for 
such searches and the fourth amendment values 
implicated by such searches. However, the cases also 
involved situations where the challenged search was, 
at least arguably, authorized by statute or ordin-
ance. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal statute); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(city 
housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967) (city building code). 
12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other 
federal cases should not be taken as approval of the 
analysis employed, or result reached, in these cases. 
We merely accede to the preeminent position of the 
United States Supreme Court in construing the 
United States Constitution. 
13. Our analysis under the Utah constitution is 
limited to the need for legislative authorization. We 
note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in 
Larocco, requires both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search and 
seizure under article I, section 14, which would seem 
to prohibit this roadblock and others. However, 
Larocco was a divided decision, with Justice Zim-
merman concurring, Justice Stewart concurring in 
result only, and Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. 
The final verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, 
unknown. 
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §§77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988) 
may reflect a determination by our legislature to not 
simply ratify judicial expansion of police power by 
silent acquiescence, but to determine through the 
political process whether such expansion is to 
become a part of Utah's law. 
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the 
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns 
with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these 
stops are exempted from stopping if doing so would 
increase their one-way trip distance by more than 
three miles or five percent. Utah Code Ann. §27-
12-19.4 (1) and (3) (Supp. 1990). 
16. In Pimental v. Dep*t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 
(R.I. 1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa. 
Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional 
under their state constitutions without considering 
whether such practices could be valid if statutorily 
authorized. 
17. We note that the factors to be considered in 
performing such balancing are myriad, complex, 
and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and dissenting 
opinions of Brennan and Stevens, J J.; Nelson v. 
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Lane County, 743 P.2d at 710-11 (appendix); see also 
Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in 
Utah, 3 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 357 (1989). Political and 
economic considerations that are the particular 
province of the legislature may also come into play: 
Utah's economy benefits greatly from tourism, and 
the state is also currently attempting to attract the 
Winter Olympic Games. Our legislators may well 
wish to consider the possible impact of suspicionless 
roadblocks upon visitors to our state. 
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states 
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our 
automobiles than in other states or in the United 
States Supreme Court's enunciation of the 
"automobile exception* under the fourth amend-
ment. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 
(1985). 
19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less than 
two hours between an illegal arrest and the obtai-
ning of an incriminating statement from the arrestee 
was viewed as insufficient to attenuate the statement 
from the arrest. 422 U.S. at 604. 
20. Additionally, Trooper Howard testified that, 
once the open container was discovered, Sims was, 
in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to citation 
and to field sobriety testing. 
21. By contrast, in Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest, that 
appeared "calculated to cause surprise, fright, and 
confusion," 422 U.S. at 605, as a causative factor 
producing the arrestee's subsequent incriminating 
statements. 
